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Abstract 
Older adults sometimes demonstrate a bias in memory for positive over negative stimuli, 
referred to as a positivity bias. In contrast, young adults demonstrate the opposite bias 
and remember more negative than positive stimuli. This resultant combination of biases 
results in a phenomenon called the positivity effect, which is, in short, manifested by a 
negative correlation between age and the proportion of negative stimuli remembered 
There is also a mood congruence effect on memory, such that individuals who are 
exposed to positive, negative, and neutral material while in a particular mood will later 
remember better the material that was congruent with their mood at the time of learning. 
The present study sought to determine whether inducing a negative mood in participants 
prior to engaging them in a recognition memory task would in any way modify the 
memory biases previously discussed. For young adults, the negativity bias was not 
demonstrated. Similarly, for older adults, the positivity bias was not demonstrated. 
Instead, for both groups, the data suggest  an  “anti-positivity”  bias,  with  roughly 
equivalent memory performance for negative and neutral items and relatively worse 
memory for positive items. Furthermore, the data suggest that, although the negative 
mood induction procedure had a significant effect on self-reported affective state, there is 
no evidence of mood congruent memory.  
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Induced Negative Mood and the Positivity Effect 
The Positivity E ffect 
A myriad of empirical examinations of emotional functioning and experience 
during late life have soundly challenged the bleak characterization of old age as a time of 
emotional dysregulation and affective flattening. Largely speculative early theories about 
emotional experience in older adulthood painted a picture of cool rationality, greater 
negative affectivity, and emotional detachment (e.g., Henry & Cumming, 1959). Contrary 
to these initial conjectures, on the whole, current research supports a more optimistic 
view. Recent findings indicate that there is, at the very least, stability in emotional 
experience, if not developmental gains. Based on a detailed exploration of daily 
emotional experience across the lifespan, Laura Carstensen and her colleagues discovered 
that older adults feel positive emotions just as frequently as young adults and, up until the 
age of 60, experience fewer negative emotions in their day-to-day activities (Carstensen, 
Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, Skorpen, & 
Hsu, 1997). Moreover, the negative emotions that older adults do experience are less 
persistent than those of young adults (Fernandes, Ross, Wiegand, & Schryer, 2008). 
Relative to their younger counterparts, older adults control their emotions more 
effectively, speak of and think about their emotions in more sophisticated and integrative 
ways, and report that emotions play a key, central role in their daily lives (Carstensen & 
Turk-Charles, 1994; Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997). These 
convergent findings illustrate that emotional experience and expression are relatively 
spared with increasing age, unlike many cognitive and health domains that show marked 
functional decline (e.g., Salthouse, Bialystok, & Craik, 2006). 
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 The increasing ratio of positive to negative emotions across the lifespan has 
several potential explanations. With stronger control over and understanding of the 
emotions one experiences, one might actively select situations that maximize positive 
experiences and minimize or dampen the impact of aversive experiences. A theory that 
encompasses exactly that notion is socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 
Fung, & Charles, 2003; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). It holds that, as time is 
perceived to be more limited, more emphasis is placed on emotionally meaningful goals 
rather than on novelty-seeking or knowledge-gathering goals. When concerns for the 
future become less relevant, an individual’s focus shifts towards optimizing current 
feeling-states. 
Socioemotional selectivity theory has three central tenets. First is that social 
interactions are critical for survival; second, humans are goal-striving, and the anticipated 
realization of those goals drives their behavior at any time; finally, individuals must 
select the goals they wish to fulfill before acting upon them. Additionally, SST holds that 
the diverse range of social goals can be placed into one of two functional categories: the 
pursuit of knowledge and the regulation of emotion. At every moment, these two goal 
types compete with one another for fulfillment; an individual’s assessment of time 
remaining is critical in determining which goal an individual ultimately pursues. Late in 
life, with an ultimate end looming, older adults are more likely to move through their 
social environment maximizing positive experiences and interactions and minimizing 
negative ones (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Technically, the shift in 
motivation described by SST is not ontogenetic. It is not aging as a process in itself that 
brings about increased focus on emotional goals; it is the perception of limited time. 
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Since chronological age is inextricably associated with time left in life, however, an age-
related phenomenon does emerge (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). As an 
explanation for older adults’ motivation to seek out positive experiences, SST has strong 
empirical validity. Furthermore, it offers specific predictions about the content of older 
adults’ memories, particularly emotionally-laden memory, as will be discussed later. 
A thorough study of the effect of aging on increased memory for emotional 
stimuli revealed that there are not systematic age-related changes in emotion-enhanced 
memory (Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2003): individuals, regardless of age, 
show enhanced memory for emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli. The average valence 
of information stored in memory, however, does appear to change with age. Multiple 
controlled laboratory studies have shown that young adults remember negative 
information better than neutral information (e.g., Fung, Lu, Goren, Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, & Wilson, 2008; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Langeslag & van Strien, 2009). 
This result is related to the phenomenon of negativity dominance, which asserts that 
negative stimuli have a greater impact on cognition than neutral or positive stimuli. 
Negativity dominance is explained in evolutionary terms; negative stimuli are often more 
adaptively informative, especially in the context of predation and danger avoidance 
(Fung, Lu, Goren, Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, & Wilson, 2008). Negativity dominance has 
been replicated in studies of young adults, but the same studies fail to find this effect in 
older adults (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Instead, studies have identified a reduced 
advantage in memory for negative material in older adults, and in some cases, a positivity 
bias. The Age X Valence interaction that results when older adults show this bias in 
memory for positive material is termed an age-related positivity effect.  
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The positivity effect is, in short, a negative correlation between age and the 
relative number of negative images recalled, after viewing images that vary in affective 
valence (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). This lifespan 
change (the positivity effect) can emerge from a number of possible scenarios involving 
different kinds of memory biases (positivity or negativity biases). A positivity bias is a 
discrete phenomenon, observed within one age group, in which there is increased 
processing of positive information (Langeslag & van Strien, 2009). Three patterns of 
biases can result in a positivity effect: when younger adults show no bias and older adults 
show a positivity bias; when younger adults show a negativity bias and older adults show 
no bias; and when younger adults show a negativity bias and older adults show a 
positivity bias (Langeslag & van Strien, 2009, p. 369) Additionally, this age difference is 
augmented with delay between time of encoding and time of retrieval; older adults were 
more likely to forget previously recalled negative images than previously recalled 
positive images when retrieval was repeated 48 hours after initial encoding and retrieval 
(Mather & Knight, 2005). This enhanced positivity effect is taken to indicate that older 
adults perform more elaborative processing when retrieving positive images as compared 
to negative images. 
In order to demonstrate that the positivity effect is truly a result of motivation 
rather than an effect of aging, Xing and Isaacowitz (2006), using a sample composed 
entirely of young adults, showed that individuals explicitly motivated to regulate their 
emotions attended less to negative images than positive images when compared to 
individuals given no viewing instructions. Technically, the study found evidence of 
negativity avoidance in attention rather than a positivity bias, but the findings nonetheless 
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provide support for the assertion that motivation can influence attentional processes. 
Gruhn, Scheibe, and Baltes (2007) and Langeslag and van Strien (2009) also contend that 
the positivity bias is more accurately termed a “reduced negativity effect.” In both of 
their experiments, young adults demonstrated a memory bias for negative images, while 
older adults hardly showed any difference in memory for negative, positive, or neutral 
images, indicating that the effect is a result of a decreased tendency in older adults to 
process negative information. 
In order to demonstrate that the positivity bias in older adults’ emotional memory 
is not associated with cognitive decline, Mather and Knight (2005) conducted an 
investigation relating cognitive control and emotional memory. Indeed, those older adults 
who were most likely to show the positivity bias were those who scored highest on 
measures of cognitive control. When participants were distracted by a concurrent task 
during encoding, older adults’ positivity bias disappeared (Mather & Knight, 2005, 
Experiment 3). This shows that older participants in the control condition employed their 
attentional resources during picture presentation to help them remember positive images 
better than negative ones in a way that young adults did not. 
Even though older adults do not have the same arsenal of processing resources 
that young adults do, multiple experiments show that older adults are adept at allocating 
what resources they do have in a way that is consistent with their chronically activated 
emotion regulation goals. Knight et al. (2007) conducted a study to investigate whether or 
not the chronic accessibility of emotional goals would affect visual fixation patterns. 
They found that in circumstances that allowed all potential resources to be put towards 
fulfilling emotional goals, the positivity effect was indeed expressed, in older adults 
INDUCED NEGATIVE MOOD AND THE POSITIVITY EFFECT          8 
visual attention preference for positive over negative or neutral stimuli. When 
participants were in a divided attention condition, however, older adults’ positivity bias 
was reversed; they were more likely to fixate on negative stimuli when distracted 
(Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, Nesmith, & Mather, 2007). This study provides good 
evidence that older adults do indeed actively modify and direct their behavior to control 
how their environment affects them and also that the positivity effect can be modified or 
eliminated under some conditions. Plainly, an individual’s motivations have a strong 
impact on attention and memory. 
Mood Congruent Memory 
Age-related motivation change is obviously not the only force acting on 
cognition, however. Affective states also have bearing on what an individual pays 
attention to and remembers (Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987). One of the phenomena 
linking emotion and memory is mood congruence. It “implies that the efficiency of 
mnemonic processing is biased by the congruence between an existing mood and the 
affective tone of the material involved” (Blaney, 1986, p. 231). The basic effect has been 
replicated many times over since the 1970’s, using a variety of mood induction 
procedures and memory tasks, including film clips, lists of emotional statements, and 
hypnotism (Alexander & Guenther, 1986; Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Ehrlichman & 
Halpern, 1988; Fielder, Nickel, Muehlfriedel, & Unkelbach, 2001; Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, 
& Hesse, 1994; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Natale & Hantas, 1982; Rholes, 
Riskind, & Lane, 1987; Rusting & DeHart, 2000; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979).  
There is a fundamental but nuanced distinction between mood congruent memory 
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and mood-dependent memory. In the case of mood congruent memory, the affective 
valence of the material to be remembered makes it more or less likely to be encoded 
and/or retrieved when one is in a particular mood. Being in the same mood during 
encoding and retrieval is not necessary. Mood-dependent memory does not depend on the 
affective valence of the material; it implies that what one learns in a given mood can be 
best remembered when one is returned to that mood (Blaney, 1986). Demonstrating true 
mood-dependent recall is more challenging than demonstrating simple mood congruence, 
and some of the studies claiming to have elicited the former are arguably only 
demonstrating the latter (Eich, 1995; Blaney, 1986).  
A widely accepted model to explain the phenomenon of mood congruence is the 
associative network and spreading-activation theory (Bower, 1981), originally proposed 
in cognitive psychology to describe encoding and retrieval of long-term memory 
(Anderson, 1983). The theory, as it has been modified to apply to mood and memory, 
supposes that every mood has its own specific, discrete node in memory that connects to 
events in one’s life during which that particular mood was experienced. Being in a 
particular mood activates that mood’s node and serves as a retrieval cue that spreads 
activation to events to which that mood has been associated in the past (Bower, 1981; 
Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978).  Items with a similar associative history are 
supposed to be connected by strong paths in the network. Pleasant stimuli receive greater 
activation from positive moods than negative moods, which makes mood-congruent (in 
this case, positive) stimuli more likely to enter consciousness and be retrievable (Fielder, 
Nickel, Muehlfriedel, & Unkelbach, 2001).  
Mood congruence has been determined not to be a result of demand 
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characteristics (Alexander & Guenther, 1986), such as when participants selectively 
report memories or mood states, based on expectations or experimenter cues, or a 
heuristic response tendency to only report memories that match one’s current mood 
(Fielder, Nickel, Muehlfriedel, & Unkelbach, 2001). Mood congruence has also been 
found in studies that sought to minimize the cognitive activity associated with the 
experience of a mood (by inducing mood with odors), indicating that mood congruence is 
not simply an effect of cognition on memory but instead a true effect of mood on memory 
(e.g., Ehrlichman & Halpern, 1988). These studies make the assumption that inducing 
mood through odors does not engage the same arsenal of cognitive resources that 
inducing mood through watching film clips or reading emotional statements do. 
Despite the confirmation of mood congruence as a sound, replicable memory 
phenomenon, there are still constraints on its inducibility and universality. Clark and 
Teasdale (1985) found that females demonstrated a stronger differential effect of 
depressed mood on the retrieval of positive and negative memories; they also showed, 
however, that women, in their past experience, had more frequently activated the 
concepts related to the study’s negative word stimuli than men did (for example, they 
reported higher daily usage ratings for the negative words than men did), giving them an 
“advantage” with regard to their pre-established associative network for negative moods 
and stimuli. Extended retention intervals (several hours to several days) also attenuate the 
effect of mood on retrieval (Bower, 1981). Mood dependent retrieval is also most likely 
to occur when the target memories are of internal events (those produced by participants 
through mental processes, like imagination) rather than external events (those provided to 
participants by the experimenter, like a word list), when the retrieval task has minimal 
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observable cues or reminders (like a free recall paradigm), and when both levels of 
pleasure and arousal are manipulated by the mood induction task (Eich, 1995). Finally, it 
appears that there is not symmetry in the respective effects of positive and negative mood 
states on memory. Participants in induced depressed moods often recall fewer target 
items overall than participants in neutral or elated mood states (Ellis, Thomas, 
McFarland, & Lane, 1985; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). 
Clearly, there are a large number of studies independently examining the 
positivity effect and mood congruence. Presently, both of these phenomena are believed 
to be genuine and replicable, but the positivity effect, in particular, is somewhat 
ephemeral in the literature (for a review, see Fernandes, Ross, Wiegand, & Schryer, 
2008). I suggest, that there may be an explanation for this lack of robustness, one that 
links mood congruence and the positivity effect directly. As of this point in time, there 
are no studies simultaneously investigating mood congruence and the positivity effect. 
This is, potentially, an oversight by previous investigators and a hole in the current 
literature. Mood congruence and the positivity effect may, in a way, subtly interact to 
determine what items people remember. Even if an investigator is not directly assessing 
mood congruence or inducing particular moods, the moods that participants carry into the 
session or which are accidentally induced during the course of a session may influence 
what items they remember, and thereby, modify biases that they would have 
demonstrated in a neutral mood.  
The present study sought to further the understanding of the positivity effect by 
including a mood induction procedure in an otherwise ordinary investigation of 
emotional memory. To this end, I conducted a within-subject experiment. I induced a 
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general negative mood in each participant and subsequently assessed their performance 
on a recognition memory task. I also induced a neutral or mildly positive mood in the 
same participants and again assessed their performance on a similar recognition memory 
task. By comparing the emotional character of participants’ memory in each mood 




 Participants for this experiment were 15 young adults, between the ages of 18 and 
22 (M = 20.18 years, SD = 1.44, 8 female) and 14 older adults between the ages of 60 and 
78 (M = 70.00, SD  = 6.12, 6 female). Two additional young adults were excluded from 
analyses, due to missing data or a low rate of correct rejections (below 60%). Of the 
young adults, 12 were White, 2 were Asian, and 1 was Hispanic. All older adults were 
White. All participants, except 1 young adult and 1 older adult, were right-handed. I 
attempted to recruit two sample populations matched for education level (young adults, 
M = 14.76 years, SD = 1.28; older adults, M = 16 years, SD = 2.11; t(29) = 2.02, p = 
0.07). Young adults were recruited from introductory psychology courses at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology and offered extra course credit in exchange for participation. 
Older adults residing in the Atlanta metropolitan area were recruited from a research 
volunteer database established by the sheltering laboratory. Older adult participants were 
remunerated $5 for every half-hour of participation. A self-report health questionnaire 
was administered to all participants to ensure that they were not taking any drugs that 
would hamper their cognitive functioning, experiencing any physical or psychological 
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illnesses that would affect their memory performance (i.e., untreated depression, seizure 
disorders, any form of dementia, a history of stroke, previous brain damage), or afflected 
by any severe, uncorrected vision impairments (i.e., cataracts, untreated glaucoma, 
macular degeneration). Additionally, all participants were screened for symptoms of 
depression using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; 
Radloff, 1977), since depression has been related to sensitivity to mood induction 
(Scherrer & Dobson, 2009) and accessibility of negative memories and cognitions (Ellis, 
Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985). Participants were included in analyses only if their 
score on the CES-D fell below 20 on the 20-item version since scores above 20 may be 
evidence of depression. Appendix A demonstrates the CES-D questionnaire as it was 
presented to participants. 
Apparatus 
 The experiment was conducted on Dell Vostro 200 desktop personal computers 
with the E-Prime application suite (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) installed. 
Participants sat in standard office chairs approximately 3.5 feet away from the monitor. 
The table was at such a height to allow the monitor to rest at eye-level. Participants used 
the Ergodex DX1 Input System with three labeled buttons to enter their responses, and 
the system tablet was placed in their laps during computer tasks. I used a montage of 
short film clips to induce a generalized negative mood. The clips included selections from 
the movies Pink F lamingos (Waters, 1972), The Champ (Lovell & Zeffirelli, 1979), and 
Creepshow (Hassnein, Rubinstein, & Romero, 1982), as well as a realistic demonstration 
of a Civil-War-era amputation (Finley-Holiday Films, 2009). Still captures from the 
negative mood film montage are shown in Figure 1. The length of the negative clip 
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montage was 4 min and 45 s. These clips have been previously piloted and determined to 
elicit emotions such as disgust and sadness (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Stark, Schienle, 
Sarlo, Palomba, Walter, & Vaitl, 2005). Eliciting emotions using film clips can result in 
high emotional intensity and complexity with moderate ecological validity and 
standardization across sessions (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). I also used a montage 
of film clips of similar total length (4 min and 47 s) to induce a neutral or mildly positive 
mood in participants. The neutral clip montage included footage of a bear cub foraging in 
a wooded area (Wyoming Photo Experience, 2007), footage of Senator Paul Kirk’s 2009 
swearing-in ceremony (C-SPAN, 2009), and footage from a short, black-and-white 
educational documentary called, “The Nature of Sound” (Coronet Instructional Films, 
1948). Still captures from the neutral mood film montage are shown in Figure 2. The 
clips in the neutral montage were chosen due to their similarity to clips previously piloted 
and determined to induce a neutral or mildly positive mood (Fucito & Juliano, 2009; 
Gomez, Zimmermann, Guttormsen-Schar, & Danuser, 2009). 
 The visual stimuli presented during the memory task consisted of 274 digitized 
color photographs taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Bradley 
& Lang, 2007) with 206 additional images, piloted and normalized by Newsome and 
Duarte (in preparation). The precise image numbers for all of the IAPS stimuli used in the 
current study are listed in Appendix C. Images were chosen on the basis of young and 
older adults grouping them in the same valence category (positive, negative, and neutral) 
and reporting similar ratings of arousal. Since the IAPS images were originally 
normalized using only young adults, the present study employed the arousal and valence 
ratings provided in the more recent paper by Gruhn and Scheibe (2008) which 
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normalized many of the IAPS images using older adult subjects. The present study 
included 160 images from each valence category, for a total of 480 images. A breakdown 
of the arousal ratings for the photographs included in the study is shown in Table 1. A 
diagram representing the percentages of images which fell into each of four content 
categories (i.e., person, object, scene/landscape, and animal; the criteria for these 
categories are detailed in Bradley & Lang, 2007) and into each of the three valence 
categories is presented in Figure 3.Sample negative, neutral, and positive photographs are 
shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
Design 
 The study was a 2 x 3 x 2 within-subject experimental design with two 
independent variables: Mood Induction and Image Valence, and one between-subjects 
variable, Age. Memory performance, broken down by Image Valence, was compared 
between the two Mood Induction conditions within each subject and also broken down by 
Age. 
Procedure 
 After participants signed documents indicating their informed consent, they sat in 
front of the computer and listened to verbal instructions regarding the task, including a 
warning about the aversive nature of some of the images and film clips. The experimenter 
assured all participants that they were free to leave the experiment session at any time 
without penalty. Participants performed two practice demonstrations of the computer 
tasks ahead (one for the study portion, the other for the test portion); these were intended 
to allow participants to adjust to the task demands and the response input procedure. 
Next, participants filled out the twenty-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
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(PANAS; Watson & Clark, 1994; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), to assess affective 
state at the beginning of the session. Appendix B contains the PANAS questionnaire as it 
was presented to participants. Participants then watched one of the film clip montages, 
either the neutral or negative one, determined by counterbalancing, while the 
experimenter was out of the room. Upon the experimenter’s return to the room the end of 
the clip, participants again filled out the PANAS, with the explicit instruction to indicate 
how they felt in that moment, regardless of what they had responded previously. 
Participants then performed the first computer portion of the experiment, using the E-
Prime program containing 120 of the 240 images selected for study, with image 
presentation order counterbalanced among participants. The images were presented one 
at a time, at a rate of 1 image per 750 ms, in the center of the screen against a white 
background. A black fixation cross appeared at the center of the screen for 3 s between 
each image. During the study block, participants were instructed to decide whether each 
image represented an indoor or outdoor scene or object and indicate their judgment by 
pressing one of two keys on the input tablet. This question was chosen because it resulted 
in a roughly even distribution of images to the two categories, “indoor” and “outdoor,” as 
judged by the experimenter. A visual representation of the study portion the experiment is 
shown in Figure 7. Immediate following completion of the study block, participants then 
performed the corresponding test portion of the task. The same 120 images presented 
previously, plus 120 novel images, were presented. Presentation rate was the same as it 
was in the study portion of the task: 750 ms for each image, with a 3 s fixation cross 
between images. Participants were instructed to press the ‘1’ key on the input tablet if 
they had seen the image previously, to press the ‘2’ key if it was a new image, and to 
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press the ‘3’ key if they were not sure whether or not they had seen the image. A visual 
representation of the test portion the experiment is shown in Figure 8. After completion 
of the test block, participants then performed selected tasks from the Memory 
Assessment Scales (Williams, 1991), performed trail-making tasks A and B, performed 
three letter fluency tasks, and completed the CES-D questionnaire. Upon completion of 
these measures, participants filled out the PANAS for a third time. Next, participants 
viewed the film clip montage not already shown, under the same circumstances described 
previously. Afterwards, participants filled out the PANAS for the fourth and final time. 
Participants then performed the second study portion of the experiment, using the E-
Prime program containing the other 120 images selected for study, and after completion 
of this study block, performed the second final test block, using the E-Prime program 
containing those 120 images just seen plus 120 novel images. Finally, the experimenter 
debriefed and compensated participants. A simplified timeline for the events of each 
experiment session is presented in Figure 9. 
Results 
Mood Induction 
Self-report scores on the 20-item PANAS questionnaire were used to determine 
the efficacy of the mood induction procedure. The PANAS is composed of 10 “positive” 
items (i.e., Interested, Excited, Strong, Enthusiastic, Proud, Alert, Inspired, Determined, 
Attentive, and Active) and 10 “negative items” (i.e., Distressed, Upset, Guilty, Scared, 
Hostile, Irritable, Ashamed, Nervous, Jittery, and Afraid), each placed on a 1 to 5 Likert 
scale. Two subscores are calculated: one for positive affect and another for negative 
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affect. These are computed by adding the individual item scores for every item in a 
category (either positive or negative). 
In general, older adults reported significantly greater positive affectivity (higher 
positive affect subscores) than did young adults, throughout the course of the session, 
[F(1, 27) = 9.35,  p = 0.005]. Reported negative affectivity (negative affect subscores) did 
not differ between age groups, however, F(1, 27) = 2.62, p = 0.12. 
The data suggest that the mood induction procedure affected older and younger 
adults in functionally comparable ways. The two groups do not show any significant 
differences in their mean positive or negative PANAS subscore changes(calculated by 
subtracting each pre-montage subscore from its corresponding post-montage subscore) 
after viewing either the neutral or negative film montages (all p values > 0.10). In other 
words, the arithmetic difference between participants’ post-montage state and 
participants’ pre-montage state is very similar for older and younger adults. For this 
reason, all participants, regardless of age, will be considered as a whole in the following 
analyses. For demonstration purposes, however, a breakdown of average PANAS 
subscores by age group can be seen in Table 2. Moreover, mean change in PANAS 
subscores, from the pre-viewing state to the post-viewing state for both film montages, 
can be viewed in Figure 10. 
Mood induction, neutral montage. 
 There was no significant difference between the average negative-item subscore 
prior to (M = 12.07, SD = 3.87)  or directly following (M = 12.17, SD = 5.09) the neutral 
mood induction procedure, [t(28) = -0.15, p = 0.884]. The average positive-item subscore 
prior to the neutral mood induction procedure (M = 30.86, SD = 8.07) was significantly 
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higher than it was directly following the neutral mood induction procedure (M = 27.97, 
SD = 1.80), however, [t(28) = 2.54, p = 0.017]. Finally, positive affectivity, as 
represented by the positive-item subscore, was significantly higher than negative 
affectivity, as represented by the negative-item subscore, directly following the neutral 
mood induction, [t(28) = 8.05, p < 0.001]. 
Mood induction, negative montage. 
 The average negative-item subscore prior to the negative mood induction 
procedure (M = 11.93, SD = 2.60) was significantly lower than it was directly following 
the negative mood induction procedure (M = 15.79, SD = 5.03),[ t(28) = -4.62, p < 
0.001]. Furthermore, the average positive-item subscore prior to the negative mood 
induction procedure (M = 31.03, SD = 9.21) was significantly higher than it was directly 
following the negative mood induction procedure (M = 25.89, SD = 9.97),[ t(28) = 4.44, p 
< 0.001]. However, positive affectivity, as represented by the positive-item subscore, was 
still significantly higher than negative affectivity, as represented by the negative-item 
subscore, directly following the negative mood induction, [t(28) = 4.47, p < 0.001]. 
Comparing across the two induction procedures, the negative montage (M = 15.79, SD = 
5.04) resulted in significantly higher negative affect than the neutral montage (M = 12.17, 
SD = 5.09), as represented by the negative-item subscore on the PANAS directly 
following each mood induction procedure, [t(28) = 3.96, p < 0.001]. Finally, neither 
positive nor negative affectivity differed significantly at any time point between 
participants who saw the negative montage first and participants who saw the neutral 
montage first (all p values > 0.10), suggesting that carryover effects from the negative 
montage are unlikely. 
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On the whole, the data suggest that the negative montage increased negative 
affectivity and decreased positive affectivity, as judged by participants’ self-reports on 
the PANAS. Furthermore, the data suggest that the neutral montage decreased positive 
affectivity to some degree but left negative affectivity unaffected. 
Memory Performance 
 Table 3 displays means and standard deviations for item memory accuracy, where 
accuracy is defined as the proportion of hits (the number of times a participant correctly 
endorsed an old image as old, divided by the total number of old images presented at test) 
minus the proportion of false alarms (the number of times a participant incorrectly 
endorsed a new image as old, divided by the total number of new images presented at 
test). “Don’t know” judgments were excluded from analyses. An Age (young, old) X 
Mood Induction (neutral, negative) X Image Valence (positive, negative, neutral) 
ANOVA for item memory accuracy indicates that there was a main effect of Age, [F(1, 
27) = 10.95, p = 0.003], such that young adults demonstrated greater memory accuracy; a 
main effect of Image Valence, [F(2, 54) = 11.49, p < 0.001]; and no main effect of Mood 
Induction, F(1, 27) = 0.36, p = 0.55. There were also no significant interaction effects (all 
p values > 0.10). To determine the source of the main effect of valence, Mood Induction 
(neutral, negative) X Image Valence (neutral, negative; neutral, positive; negative, 
positive) follow-up ANOVAs were conducted. They indicate that item memory accuracy 
for negative items was greater than for positive items, [F(1, 28) = 7.20, p = 0.01] and 
greater for neutral items than for positive items, [F(1, 28) = 24.02, p < 0.001]. There is no 
significant difference between item memory accuracy for negative and neutral items, 
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however, [F(1, 28) = 2.85, p = 0.10]. Figure 11 displays item memory accuracy, as a 
function of age and image valence, collapsed across mood induction conditions. 
An additional Age (young, old) X Mood Induction (neutral, negative) X Image 
Valence (positive, negative, neutral) X Decision Category (hit, false alarm) ANOVA was 
conducted to investigate the possibility that there was a positivity effect inherent in the 
false alarms of young and older adults. This time, there was no main effect of Age, [F(1, 
27) = 4.13, p = 0.06]; there was a main effect of Image Valence, [F(2, 54) = 3.85, p = 
0.03]; and there was no main effect of Mood Induction, [F(1, 27) = 0.28, p = 0.60] or any 
interaction effects (all p values > 0.10). Because there was no Age X Image Valence 
interaction, and therefore no evidence for a positivity effect, no follow-up ANOVAs were 
conducted.  
Reaction T ime 
 To determine whether or not mood induction or image valence had any effects on 
reaction time at test, an Age (young, old) X Mood Induction (neutral, negative) X Image 
Valence) x 4 (Decision Category) ANOVA was conducted. Decision Category here 
simply denotes whether an item was a hit (i.e., correctly endorsed as old), miss (i.e. 
incorrectly endorsed as new), correct rejection (i.e., correctly endorsed as new), or false 
alarm (i.e., incorrectly endorsed as old) at test. The ANOVA indicates that there is a main 
effect of Age, such that older adults were faster to respond [F(1, 9) = 8.64, p = 0.02]; no 
main effect of Image Valence, [F(2, 18) = 2.30, p = 0.14]; and no main effect of Mood 
Induction, [F(1, 9) = 0.08, p = 0.78]. There are also no significant interaction effects (all 
p values > 0.10). 
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To determine whether or not mood induction or image valence had any effects on 
reaction time at study, an Age (young, old) X Mood Induction (neutral, negative) X 
Image Valence (positive, negative, neutral) x Decision Category (hit, miss) ANOVA was 
conducted. (The two levels of Decision Category are here hit and miss, since the analysis 
is considering reaction times at study for all old items presented at test.) The ANOVA 
indicates that there is a main effect of Image Valence, [F(2, 34) = 8.35, p = 0.001]; no 
main effect of Age, [F(1, 17) = 3.69, p = 0.07]; and no main effect of Mood Induction, 
[F(1, 17) = 1.57, p = 0.23]. There are also no significant interaction effects (all p values > 
0.10). To determine the source of the main effect of valence, Mood Induction (neutral, 
negative) X Image Valence (neutral, negative; neutral, positive; negative, positive) X 
Decision Category (hit, miss) follow-up ANOVAs were conducted. They indicate that 
reaction time at study for negative items is greater than for neutral items, [F(1, 18) = 
5.83, p = 0.03] and also greater for negative items than for positive items, [F(1, 19) = 
23.87, p < 0.001]. There is no significant difference between reaction times at study for 
neutral and positive items, however, [F(1, 23) = 3.27, p = 0.08]. Figure 12 displays mean 
reaction times at study, broken down by age and image valence. 
C ES-D and Neuropsychological Task Scores 
 CES-D scores did not differ significantly between younger (M = 11.13, SD = 
5.63) and older adults (M = 9.07, SD = 4.92), [F(1, 27) = 1.096, p  = 0.305]. Additionally, 
no participant scored high enough on the CES-D (above 20) to be excluded from 
analyses. Finally, mean scores, broken down by age group, for the MAS tasks, trail-
making tasks, and letter fluency tasks are delineated in Table 4. 
Discussion 
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 Because there is no Age X Image Valence interaction effect for memory 
accuracy, false alarm rates, or reaction times, it must be concluded that the current study 
found no evidence for the positivity effect in any of the behavioral measures considered. 
That is, the data suggest that the valence of images remembered has no correlation with 
age. Even though there is no evidence for the negativity or positivity biases, there is 
preliminary evidence for some kind of “anti-positivity” bias in both age groups, 
evidenced by relatively worse memory for positive items as compared to neutral and 
negative items. At present, I have not uncovered any singular explanation for this unusual 
pattern, but there are a few plausible accounts.  
The apparent memory bias could be actually due to some systematic difference 
between the images used in the current study and images used in previous studies 
investigating emotional phenomena in memory. The present study utilized not only 
extensively piloted IAPS images but also somewhat limitedly piloted images, from 
Newsome & Duarte (in preparation). It is possible that these relatively untried images 
have valence or arousal ratings that represent the average judgments of a small sample, 
rendering them limited in their generalizability. For example, images given the label of 
neutral by the sample examined by Newsome & Duarte may be given the label of 
negative or positive by a larger, more representative sample, making it difficult to 
perform a valid analysis based on image valence. Furthermore, the images were selected 
for the current study solely on the basis of having arousal and valence ratings that were 
equivalent for older and younger adults. This decision was made at the cost of equalizing 
arousal ratings across the three valence categories, resulting in a stimulus set whose 
negative images were almost exclusively highly arousing, as illustrated in Table 1. Future 
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investigations would likely benefit from equating arousal across valence categories. 
Finally, neutral item memory accuracy may be as high as it is due to the disproportionate 
number of objects included in the neutral category, as compared to the positive and 
negative categories, demonstrated in Figure 3. This preponderance of object images in a 
single valence category is true not only for the stimulus set of the current study, but also 
for the IAPS set as a whole (see Bradley & Lang, 2007). It is possible, although currently 
uninvestigated, that for the current study, enhanced memory for objects is being confused 
for enhanced memory for neutral stimuli. If this enhanced object memory (and thereby, 
enhanced neutral item memory) is exhibited concurrently with a negativity bias (in either 
the young or older adults, or possibly both), it would create the pattern of the results at 
hand: the appearance of an “anti-positivity” bias or the illusion of diminished memory for 
positive stimuli. Previous studies have also met with limited success in eliciting the 
positivity effect. For example, in analyzing the conditions that do and do not elicit a 
positivity bias, Tomaszczyk, Fernandes, and MacLeod (2008) found that the self-reported 
personal relevance of pictorial stimuli affects whether or not an Age X Valence 
interaction was found. Only when pictures were rated as low in personal relevance did a 
positivity bias emerge. This same finding was replicated by Fernandes, Ross, Wiegand, & 
Schryer (2008). Tomaszczyk and her colleagues (2008) took this finding to be a potential 
explanation for why some studies have found a positivity bias while other very similar 
studies have not; the materials used in these two types of studies may have differed in 
their degrees of personal relevance. Clearly, these studies and the present study 
demonstrate that there are a multitude of potential impediments to uncovering the 
positivity effect in any study seeking to investigate it. 
INDUCED NEGATIVE MOOD AND THE POSITIVITY EFFECT          25 
Moreover, since there is no Mood Induction X Image Valence interaction effect in 
memory accuracy, the current study also found no evidence for negative mood congruent 
memory. At the same time, however, the data suggest that the negative mood induction 
procedure indeed increased negative affect and decreased positive affect significantly, 
while the neutral mood induction procedure had no clear directional effect on mood. 
Importantly, analyses also suggest that there were limited or no carryover effects from the 
negative montage; in other words, it appears that the negative mood induced in 
participants who saw the negative montage first did not continue on into the time before 
and after the neutral montage, which decreases the likelihood of confounding.  
The emergence of a mood congruence phenomenon was, by no means, guaranteed 
by the literature to date, particularly for older adults. The vast majority of studies of 
mood congruent memory exclusively used young adult participants. One of the only 
studies in the literature that directly assessed the effects of negative mood on the valence 
of older adults’ memory found mood congruence for both young and older adults, 
although results heavily depended on the particular task under consideration (Knight, 
Maines, & Robinson, 2002).  
As discussed previously, socioemotional selectivity theory contends that older 
adults are highly motivated to seek meaningful and positive emotional experiences on a 
daily basis (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). This change in motivation across 
the lifespan may lead to older adults having more chronically activated emotion 
regulation goals than young adults (Mather & Knight, 2005), thereby making them more 
likely to spontaneously employ regulation strategies. Recent findings also provide 
support for the notion that, when older adults do engage in emotion regulation, it is at a 
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lesser cost, in terms of cognitive resources, than it is for young adults (Scheibe & 
Blanchard-Fields, 2009). These convergent findings are of interest to the current study 
because previous examinations of mood and emotional memory have found that people 
who reported high levels of personality traits related to a greater probability of negative 
mood regulation were more likely to demonstrate mood-incongruent memory than 
individuals low on these same traits (Rusting & DeHart. 2000). If the older adults of the 
current study spontaneously employed mood repair strategies during the course of the 
session (emotion regulation, of a sort), this may account for the difficulty in 
demonstrating mood congruent memory. Future studies would likely benefit from 
assessing participants’ tendencies toward emotion regulation to determine whether or not 
this is an unconsidered variable influencing the likelihood of mood congruence. 
The lack of evidence for mood congruent memory for young adults is still 
troublesome, however. Using a different type of mood induction procedure, such as 
hypnosis, the Velten mood induction protocol, odors, or music may result in a different 
scenario, since all of these procedures have resulted in targeted, specific moods with high 
ecological validity (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994). Additionally, including a 
positive mood induction condition may benefit future studies, since some previous 
research has suggested that positive mood congruence is easier to elicit than negative 
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Table 1 
Number of Low-Arousal and High-Arousal Images in Each Valence Category for 
Selected Stimuli from IAPS and Newsome and Duarte  
 IAPS Newsome & Duarte 
 Low High Low High 
Negative 0 106 3 51 
Neutral 51 38 23 48 
Positive 43 36 30 51 
Note: Arousal ratings for IAPS images taken from Bradley & Lang, 2007 and Gruhn & 
Scheibe, 2008. Arousal ratings for Newsome & Duarte images taken from Newsome & 
Duarte, in preparation.
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Table 2 
PANAS Positive- and Negative-Item Subscores Before and After Montage Viewing, as a 
Function of Age 
  Negative montage Neutral montage 
  YA OA YA OA 
PANAS 
subscore 





































Note. Values in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
INDUCED NEGATIVE MOOD AND THE POSITIVITY EFFECT          36 
Table 3 
Item Memory Accuracy as a Function of Image Valence, Age, and Mood Induction 
  Negative montage  Neutral montage 



























Notes. Accuracy is defined as hit rate minus false alarm rate. Values in parentheses 
represent standard deviations. 
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Table 4 
Mean Neuropsychological Task Scores, as a Function of Age 
 YA OA 
Letter fluency 45.6 words (10.17) 48.54 words (11.04) 
Immediate list recall a 11.33 items (0.89) 10.38 items (0.77) 
Delayed list recall a 11.8 items (0.56) 11.08 items (1.03) 
Forward verbal span b 7.07 digits (1.16) 7.07 digits (1.19) 
Backward verbal span b 5.67 digits (1.45) 5.92 digits (1.11) 
Trails A 21.95 s (5.69) 30.87 s (10.52) 
Trails B 41.06 s (9.87) 54.97 s (10.7) 
Visual recognition c 19.47 points (0.74) 17.31 points (1.75) 
Visual reproduction d 9.60 points (0.74) 6.38 points (2.63) 
Notes. Values in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
a Maximum score of 12. 
b Maximum score of 9. 
c Maximum score of 20. 
d Maximum score of 10. 
 
 
INDUCED NEGATIVE MOOD AND THE POSITIVITY EFFECT          38 
 
F igure 1. Still captures from the negative mood induction montage.
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F igure 2. Still captures from the neutral mood induction montage.
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F igure 3. Percentage of pictures in current study which derive from IAPS (Bradley & 
Lang, 2007) or Newsome and Duarte (in preparation), subdivided by image content and 
image valence.
INDUCED NEGATIVE MOOD AND THE POSITIVITY EFFECT          41 
 
F igure 4. A sample negative image.
INDUCED NEGATIVE MOOD AND THE POSITIVITY EFFECT          42 
 
F igure 5. A sample neutral image.
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F igure 6. A sample positive image.
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F igure 7. Computer task procedure for study portion of experiment.




F igure 8. Computer task procedure for test portion of experiment. 
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Perform memory test for images 
 
Complete PANAS 
Watch first montage 
Complete PANAS 
Study images 
Perform memory test for images 
Complete neuropsychological tasks 
Complete PANAS 
Watch second montage 
Complete PANAS 
Study images 
F igure 9. Timeline for each experiment session. 
BEGIN 
END 
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F igure 10. Mean change in PANAS positive- and negative-item subscores, from pre-
viewing state to post-viewing state, as a function of mood induction condition and age. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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F igure 11. Item memory accuracy, as a function of image valence and age group. 
Accuracy is defined as hit rate minus false alarm rate. Error bars represent standard errors 
of the mean. Asterisks indicate significance of p < 0.05. Both negative and neutral item 
memory accuracies were significantly different from positive item accuracy.
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F igure 12. Mean reaction time at study, as a function of age and image valence. Error 
bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks indicate significance of p < 0.05. 
Reaction times to negative items were significantly higher than reaction times for positive 
or neutral items. 
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Appendix A 
In the following you will find statements about the way most people feel at one time or 
another. There is no such thing as a "right" or "wrong" answer, because people are 
different. All you have to do is answer the statements according to how you have felt 
during the past week. Don't answer according to how you USUALLY feel, but rather 
how you have felt DURING THE PAST WEEK. Each statement is followed by four 
choices. Circle the letter corresponding to your choice. Circle ONLY ONE letter for each 
statement. For example: 
During the past week, I was happy. 
 a. Rarely or none of the time (less than one day) 
 b. Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 c. Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days) 
 d. Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
In the example, you could, of course, choose any ONE of the answers. If you felt really 
happy, you would choose and circle d. If you felt very unhappy, you would circle a. The 
b and c answers give you middle choices. Keep these points in mind. 
1. Don't spend too much time thinking about your answer. Give the first natural answer 
as it comes to you. 
2. Answer EVERY question, even if it doesn't seem to apply to you very well. 
3. Answer as honestly as you can what is true of you. Please do not mark something 
because it seems like "the right thing to say". 
 
a = Rarely or none of the time (less than one day) 
b = Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
c = Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days) 
d = most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
1. During the past week, I was bothered by things that 
usually don't bother me. a          b          c          d  
2. During the past week, I did not feel like eating; my 
appetite was poor. a          b          c          d  
3. During the past week, I felt that I could not shake off 
the blues even with help from my family or friends. a          b          c          d  
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4. During the past week, I felt that I was just as good as 
other people. 
 
a          b          c          d 
5. During the past week, I had trouble keeping my mind 
on what I was doing. a          b          c          d  
6. During the past week, I felt depressed. a          b          c          d  
7. During the past week, I felt that everything I did was an 
effort. a          b          c          d  
8. During the past week, I felt hopeful about the future. a          b          c          d  
9. During the past week, I thought my life had been a 
failure. a          b          c          d  
10. During the past week, I felt fearful. a          b          c          d  
11. During the past week, my sleep was restless. a          b          c          d  
12. During the past week, I was happy. a          b          c          d  
13. During the past week, I talked less than usual. a          b          c          d  
14. During the past week, I felt lonely. a          b          c          d  
15. During the past week, people were unfriendly. a          b          c          d  
16. During the past week, I enjoyed life. a          b          c          d  
17. During the past week, I had crying spells. a          b          c          d  
18. During the past week, I felt sad. a          b          c          d  
19. During the past week, I felt that people dislike me. a          b          c          d  
20. During the past week, I could not get "going". a          b          c          d  
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Appendix B 
Directions: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer next to that word.  
Indicate to what extent you feel that way RIGHT NOW. 
 
Use the following scale to record your answers: 
(1) = Very slightly or not at all 
(2) = A little  
(3) = Moderately  
(4) = Quite a bit 




Or Not At 
All 
A Little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Active 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix C 
Images selected from IAPS 
1050 2375.1 3022 5780 7053 8060 9265 
1201 2381 3051 5781 7055 8090 9270 
1230 2383 3062 5811 7059 8116 9280 
1274 2385 3101 5814 7060 8185 9290 
1300 2387 3150 5830 7080 8186 9320 
1303 2391 3160 5831 7090 8200 9331 
1310 2393 3170 5891 7100 8210 9342 
1463 2395 3181 5920 7150 8230 9400 
1500 2397 3215 5971 7161 8232 9405 
1525 2398 3220 6022 7175 8350 9415 
1590 2399 3230 6150 7180 8370 9419 
1603 2410 3250 6212 7184 8371 9420 
1616 2480 3350 6213 7207 8380 9423 
1620 2499 3400 6230 7220 8400 9424 
1670 2501 3500 6300 7224 8420 9425 
1721 2510 3550.2 6311 7233 8461 9426 
1920 2516 4233 6315 7235 8470 9428 
1930 2550 4599 6360 7248 8475 9430 
1935 2590 4601 6415 7260 8480 9433 
1945 2595 4613 6510 7280 8490 9435 
1999 2598 4622 6560 7325 8496 9470 
2091 2655 4640 6571 7350 8497 9490 
2120 2683 4700 6821 7359 8503 9500 
2141 2690 5001 6825 7380 8531 9530 
2190 2691 5010 6831 7410 8540 9571 
2200 2692 5200 6834 7430 9000 9600 
2214 2700 5201 6838 7480 9006 9611 
2216 2716 5220 6910 7487 9007 9622 
2220 2717 5260 7000 7493 9010 9630 
2224 2745.1 5460 7002 7508 9041 9635.1 
2230 2749 5470 7004 7546 9042 9800 
2272 2750 5480 7010 7570 9050 9810 
2303 2751 5551 7020 7590 9090 9830 
2306 2753 5594 7025 7595 9120 9900 
2310 2780 5611 7030 7640 9140  
2311 2799 5623 7040 7705 9180  
2332 2800 5631 7041 7820 9181  
2352.1 2900 5700 7043 7920 9190  
2370 3005.1 5740 7050 7950 9250  
2373 3017 5779 7052 8034 9254  
 
